Governance

India Links Cross-Border River Cooperation to Bilateral Ties at COP31

At COP31 in Antalya, India questioned whether older river-sharing arrangements can be separated from bilateral relations. Pakistan defended existing agreements and its climate minister has now arrived in New Delhi for a regional forum. Neither the summit remarks nor that visit establishes a change in treaty status or actual river flows.

By The Raisina Post

Archival view of the Indus Gorge near Gilgit, Pakistan, in February 2008
Image information

Indus Gorge near Gilgit, Pakistan, photographed on 19 February 2008. This archival view does not depict COP31, a contemporary water-flow measurement or a current infrastructure project. Heavyrunner / Wikimedia Commons. Cropped to 16:9; the derivative remains under CC BY-SA 3.0. Original photograph and context; CC BY-SA 3.0 licence.

India brought its dispute over cross-border water cooperation with Pakistan into the climate negotiations at Antalya this week, arguing that older arrangements must be assessed against changes in population, technology, climate and bilateral relations. Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav made the intervention during India's COP31 national statement on 18 November, following Pakistan's warning about the risks to people downstream. The Indian Express reported that Yadav's remarks referred implicitly to the Indus Waters Treaty, although he did not name it. The Indian government's published statement summary confirms the occasion and climate agenda but does not reproduce the river passage. 1 2 4

The disagreement was already visible at the summit before India delivered its statement. Pakistan's government said Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had urged other leaders to protect existing water-sharing arrangements and prevent the use of water as a means of political pressure. His statement also called for climate finance that would not increase the debt burden of vulnerable countries. Yadav subsequently treated broader relations between neighbouring states as relevant to the possibility of constructive river cooperation. Neither intervention announced a newly negotiated arrangement or a decision by the climate conference about the allocation of the Indus basin's water. 1 4

The original treaty was signed in 1960, with the World Bank's involvement, and established a framework covering six rivers. The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej are the eastern rivers allocated to India. The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab are the western rivers principally allocated to Pakistan, with specific Indian uses permitted under the agreement. An Indian government background statement identifies permitted uses including domestic, agricultural and non-consumptive purposes. The distinction matters because an upstream development project may raise questions about permissible design or storage without necessarily constituting a permanent diversion of water or changing the allocation itself. 5 7

India placed the treaty in abeyance in 2025 following the Pahalgam terrorist attack and made restoration conditional on Pakistan's actions concerning cross-border terrorism. Pakistan disputes the validity of the unilateral decision. These positions are now part of an ongoing diplomatic and legal conflict, rather than a common understanding of how the treaty should operate. New Delhi regards the security relationship as integral to cooperation; Islamabad maintains that international obligations should continue to apply despite political hostility. The fact that both governments have set out their positions publicly is not evidence that either has accepted the other's interpretation. 1 3 9

The legal dispute has also moved beyond general diplomatic statements. On 31 August, a Court of Arbitration in the Indus Waters Western Rivers arbitration issued an award addressing treaty status and a separate interim measures order concerning India's Ratle hydroelectric project. Reuters reported that the panel found the agreement remained binding and required limits on work at the project. India rejected the award and the tribunal's authority, with the external affairs ministry maintaining that the decision to keep the treaty in abeyance remained operative. The award and New Delhi's response must therefore both be distinguished from a negotiated settlement or a change accepted by the two governments. 7 8 9

What happens to the river is a separate question from what happens to the agreement. Hindustan Times reported in October that, despite more than a year of abeyance, India had yet to draw sizeable additional quantities from the three western rivers. That finding concerns the practical limits of infrastructure and does not demonstrate that every individual downstream flow has been unchanged throughout the period. Construction schedules, available storage and seasonal water availability constrain how rapidly new projects can affect the system. Assessing a claim of substantial diversion requires reliable observations for the relevant river, location and period, rather than an inference from a ministerial speech. 6 8

The choice of a climate conference as a venue illustrates how the two governments connect this dispute to different wider concerns. India's official summary of its national statement emphasises equity under the climate regime and fulfilment of wealthy countries' financing obligations. Pakistan's national statement likewise sought greater assistance with the effects of climate change while invoking downstream water security. The financing debate is shared ground in terms of demands on richer economies, even while the two countries disagree on bilateral water obligations. Reuters' reporting on the summit also identifies a broader unresolved question about the accessibility and scale of finance available to vulnerable states. 2 4 13

Pakistan renewed its objections in a United Nations discussion this week. Dawn reported on 19 November that its representative characterised India's treaty decision as contrary to international law and cited the August arbitration award. Islamabad's concern about downstream communities is a stated diplomatic position and should not be confused with independently measured losses resulting from a particular Indian project. Nor did the UN discussion itself produce a binding agreement on water allocation. The distinction is important because statements made in multilateral settings can increase diplomatic pressure without changing existing physical infrastructure or settling outstanding disputes about the treaty. 3 7 9

The controversy now overlaps with a separate regional engagement. Pakistan's climate change minister, Musadik Masood Malik, has reached New Delhi to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's Civilisational Dialogue Forum, which runs from 20 to 22 November. Pakistan had announced his designation before the climate conference concluded, and Dawn and Hindustan Times reported his arrival on Friday. The visit stands out because ministerial contacts have been rare amid bilateral tensions. But the announced purpose of the trip is a cultural and regional dialogue, not a formal Indus negotiation. No bilateral water agreement should be inferred from Malik's presence in India. 10 11 12

The relevant developments to watch are formal notices about treaty arrangements, documented changes to project design or construction, comparable water-flow observations and any confirmed bilateral talks. Until such evidence emerges, the Antalya intervention is best understood as a further public disagreement over the conditions for water cooperation. It shows how the treaty dispute has reached a climate forum, while the New Delhi meeting demonstrates that participation in a multilateral event can coexist with unresolved bilateral tensions. Neither provides a basis for declaring the treaty formally terminated by mutual agreement or the western rivers' flows stopped. 1 6 7 10 11

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