In depth

Suzlon Sold Adani Turbines. Now Adani Is Selling to Its Customers.

Adani once bought Suzlon turbines. Now Adani Wind sells to outside developers, while JSW manufactures for its own projects. Inside India's changing wind industry.

By The Raisina Post Finance Desk

Suzlon wind turbines under a broad cloudy sky at a wind farm near Sinnar, Maharashtra
Image information

Wind turbines at a Suzlon wind farm near Sinnar, Nashik, Maharashtra, photographed 16 June 2016. Archival photograph, not an image of the Adani or JSW manufacturing facilities. Photograph: SuyogJoshiPhotography / Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0. Original image, no editorial alteration.

In 2022, Suzlon secured another turbine order from Adani Green Energy. In 2026, an Adani group manufacturer reported more than 1 GW of orders from developers outside the group. In between, the buyer–supplier relationship in India’s wind business began to change. Some large renewable-power developers are no longer content merely to purchase turbines. They are manufacturing equipment themselves, or selling it to other developers. ¹ ²

The shift is not a simple story of customers abandoning Suzlon. The developer that bought Suzlon turbines, Adani Green Energy, is a different legal entity from Adani New Industries, which operates Adani Wind. Nor has JSW Energy established itself as a third-party turbine supplier on the same terms as Adani. Yet these distinctions make the competitive change more important, not less: groups that once depended on turbine manufacturers can increasingly move up the supply chain, while their procurement divisions can choose between more suppliers.

When Suzlon announced a 48.3 MW order from Adani Green in October 2022, it described the contract as an addition to an existing 226.8 MW order from August 2021. Both contracts represented the familiar arrangement in renewable power: the developer built a generation project, while Suzlon supplied the turbine technology and related services. Four years later, Adani Wind’s 16 November announcement said its cumulative orders from independent power producers outside the Adani Group had exceeded 1 GW. It also reported production of 91.2-metre blades at Mundra, Gujarat, after certification of its 5 MW turbine platform for serial manufacture. ¹ ²

More turbines. More revenue. Lower margins.

Four source-backed editorial figures show Suzlon's performance and its shift toward integrated project execution. A separate timeline explains Adani's change of role without mixing incompatible statistics.

6+ GWSuzlon's reported turbine order book · October 2026
>1 GWAdani Wind's cumulative external IPP orders · November 2026
600 MWJSW Halol blade output equivalent per year · June 2026

These headline metrics have different definitions and periods; the numbers are not a ranking of identical manufacturing or sales capacity. Suzlon · Adani Wind · JSW Energy.

From customer to competitor: the Adani relationship

Three documented milestones, not a like-for-like comparison of order books

  1. 226.8 MWSuzlon equipment order announced for Adani Green Energy
  2. 48.3 MWRepeat Suzlon order from Adani Green Energy
  3. >1 GWAdani Wind reports cumulative turbine orders from external developers
Different entities within the Adani group and different order types: these figures must not be plotted as a single sales series. Sources: Suzlon's 2022 company announcement and Adani Wind, 16 November 2026.

Adani no longer needs to be only the buyer

The change had been years in preparation. Adani Enterprises’ 2024–25 annual report described four registered turbine models, spanning both 3 MW-class and larger machines, and manufacturing capacity expanded to 2.25 GW annually. Its ambition to become one of India’s top three turbine suppliers was explicitly a target, not a market position already secured. In July 2025, Adani Enterprises reported its first external 300 MW order for a 3.3 MW platform, marking a move beyond supplying the group’s own renewable-power portfolio. ³ ⁴

That external business now has identifiable customers. An October 2026 report by Fortune India attributed 696.2 MW of Adani Wind orders to five developers: 300 MW from Purvah Green Power, 155 MW from Jindal India Power, 109.2 MW from NTPC Renewable Energy, 82.5 MW from Aditya Birla Renewables and 49.5 MW from Integrum Energy. Those allocations were reported on the basis of people familiar with the transactions, rather than fully disclosed project contracts. An order is not a completed delivery or a commissioned wind farm. ⁹

The overlap was sufficiently important to be raised on Suzlon’s own earnings call. During its 29 October 2026 question-and-answer session, an analyst pointed to Adani’s orders from developers that had previously been Suzlon customers, including NTPC, Aditya Birla Renewables and Purvah. Group chief executive Ajay Kapur replied that these customers continued to buy from Suzlon too. This is a more precise description of the emerging market than the claim that every major customer has switched sides: developers are gaining alternatives, and contracts can be distributed across different turbine suppliers. ⁸

The commercial consequences depend on more than which company owns a factory. Turbine purchases must fit the wind characteristics of a particular site, lenders’ technical conditions, delivery schedules, maintenance arrangements, spare-part availability and long-term operating performance. An incumbent manufacturer can possess decades of field experience that a new entrant cannot instantly reproduce. But a credible new supplier can still change bargaining power, pricing discussions and the allocation of future projects.

JSW is pursuing a different kind of independence

JSW Energy’s strategy is more clearly rooted in securing equipment for its own generating projects. In March 2024 its subsidiary JSW Renewable Technologies entered into a technology-licensing agreement with SANY Renewable Energy for 3.X MW turbine generators to be manufactured in India for captive use. The company described reliable supply and a reduction in overall project costs as reasons for the arrangement. It was not a declaration that every JSW turbine would be designed independently or sold to outside developers. ⁶

JSW then announced in June 2026 that its Halol, Gujarat, wind-blade factory had been commissioned, with stated annual capacity of up to 450 blades, equivalent to equipment for about 600 MW of wind projects. The equivalence is a production-capacity estimate for blades; it is not the same as 600 MW of complete turbines delivered, or 600 MW of generating plants commissioned. A blade plant, a turbine assembly operation and an operating wind farm are different stages of the energy value chain. ⁵

The economics of this approach can be attractive to a developer with a substantial project pipeline. Buying turbines from a third party leaves the developer exposed to manufacturing slots, transport bottlenecks and supplier schedules. Owning more of the equipment chain may provide a degree of control. But the decision also shifts risk inward: factories require capital, steady utilisation, quality assurance, licensed technology and long-lived warranty support. In-house production is not automatically cheaper or more reliable.

There is a corresponding limit to the rivalry with Suzlon. A developer manufacturing for its own consumption can remove some demand from the external market without necessarily competing to sell turbines to another developer. Adani Wind has already disclosed outside orders; JSW’s announced programme has placed greater emphasis on captive supply. The result is competitive pressure through two different channels, not evidence that the two companies have identical businesses. ⁶ ²

Suzlon is growing, but profitability is being tested

Suzlon’s own quarterly results reject any suggestion of an established manufacturer already being displaced. For the quarter ended 30 September 2026, it delivered 710 MW of turbines in India, compared with 565 MW a year earlier, and commissioned 454 MW. Revenue rose from about ₹3,866 crore to ₹4,869 crore, a year-on-year increase of roughly 26 per cent. Its order book exceeded 6 GW, with more than 1.5 GW of fresh orders received during the first half of FY27. These metrics describe different stages of business: order intake, equipment delivery and commissioning must not be added together as if they measure the same thing. ⁷

Suzlon is delivering more turbines

Net turbine deliveries · July–September quarters · MW

710 MW+25.7% year on year
Deliveries are turbine equipment supplied, not capacity commissioned or electricity generated. Source: Suzlon Q2 FY27 results, 29 October 2026.

Revenue has risen alongside deliveries

Consolidated revenue from operations · July–September quarters · ₹ crore

₹4,869 crore+25.9% year on year
Reported quarterly revenue. The increase cannot be attributed solely to turbine deliveries. Source: Suzlon Q2 FY27 results, 29 October 2026.

But stronger turnover did not automatically produce stronger margins. Suzlon’s EBITDA was approximately ₹720 crore, while the corresponding margin fell from 18.6 per cent to 14.8 per cent. That is a decline of 3.8 percentage points, not a 3.8 per cent relative fall. Management attributed pressure to changes in turbine-customer and project scope mix, foreign-exchange and commodity volatility, and higher operating expenditure associated partly with its transformation programme. It did not publish a calculation demonstrating that Adani or JSW caused the decline. ⁷ ⁸

But a smaller share becomes operating profit

Consolidated EBITDA margin · July–September quarters · percent

−3.8 pp18.6% → 14.8%
Percentage-point movement, not a 3.8% relative change. No causal link to Adani or JSW competition is established. Source: Suzlon Q2 FY27 results, 29 October 2026.

The distinction matters in an industry where easy explanations can be seductive. A lower margin alongside more competitors does not prove that one caused the other. Suzlon’s equipment mix, scope of project execution, commodity prices and the timing of revenue recognition all influence profitability. If new suppliers sustain a competitive threat, its financial effects would need to be established through future bidding outcomes, contract terms and the company’s own disclosures rather than inferred from one quarter. ⁸

Defending the business beyond the turbine

Suzlon is responding by presenting itself as a more integrated wind and renewable-project supplier rather than a company paid only when a machine leaves the factory. Its October results reported that engineering, procurement and construction scope formed 38 per cent of the order book, with management targeting 50 per cent by FY28. The company also attributed more than 1.1 GW of first-half order intake to its development-company model. The target is forward-looking and should not be represented as an achieved figure. ⁷

Moving beyond the turbine sale

EPC component as a share of Suzlon's order book · management report and target

38%Current disclosed share
Q2 FY27: EPC scope in order book38%
Reported 202650% goal for FY28 · not achieved
EPC is engineering, procurement and construction. The dashed target is forward-looking, not a second historical observation. Source: Suzlon, 29 October 2026.

For a wind developer, a turbine is not the only obstacle. A viable site must have adequate wind resource, land access, permits, grid connectivity, transport routes and financing. An equipment company that helps assemble these pieces may be more valuable than a manufacturer supplying only a nacelle and blades. Long-term maintenance is another source of differentiation, because installed turbines require replacement parts, inspections, software support and performance management over many years.

Suzlon has an established fleet and service operation that newer manufacturers cannot replicate overnight. Nevertheless, closer relationships with project development can create overlap with the very companies it supplies. The industry’s traditional distinction between developers, original-equipment manufacturers and service providers is becoming less stable. The same group can now finance wind generation, own component factories and procure technology from outside when that is commercially useful.

The bigger question is who controls the next project

India’s wind-manufacturing ambition makes this contest larger than the fortunes of one company. Industrial policy has encouraged domestic manufacturing of turbine components. Large developers possess capital and future project demand; established manufacturers possess product histories, technical capability and service networks. More factories could create a more resilient market, but they do not automatically solve the problems of land, electricity evacuation, permits, project execution or turbine reliability.

It is also misleading to place every large number on one league table. Suzlon’s order book of more than 6 GW represents future contracted equipment and related project work. Adani Wind’s external orders above 1 GW represent a different manufacturer’s cumulative outside contracts. JSW’s 600 MW-equivalent figure describes annual blade-making capacity. They have different definitions, reporting dates and business purposes. None by itself establishes installed megawatts, market share or profit. ⁷ ² ⁵

The next evidence to watch is specific: whether Adani repeatedly wins customers beyond its own group and converts orders into commissioned projects; whether JSW’s captive manufacturing meaningfully lowers its total project cost; and whether Suzlon sustains orders, service quality and margins as buyers acquire more options. Those outcomes cannot yet be read off announcements about factory capacity.

There is no established winner in this change. Suzlon continues to deliver turbines at scale. Adani Wind is building a third-party order book. JSW is building a more vertically integrated supply chain for its own projects. A developer can remain a Suzlon customer even while buying from its rivals or producing part of its equipment internally. The deeper competitive change is that the line separating a turbine manufacturer’s customers from its competitors has begun to disappear.

The Raisina Post Finance Desk · 20 November 2026