Guest opinion

What the transaction tax can and cannot explain

Derivatives trading fell after India's securities transaction tax increase. Debashree C. examines why the available data cannot establish how much of the decline the tax caused.

By Debashree C.

National Stock Exchange building in Mumbai, India, in 2019
Image information

Photograph: Ganesh Dhamodkar / Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Cropped to 16:9.

India raised the securities transaction tax on derivatives in April 2026. Trading in index futures and options then fell sharply. Those two facts are widely treated as one fact, and the evidence does not support joining them.

Between March and May 2026, average daily turnover in index futures fell about 44%, from ₹41,418 crore to ₹23,197 crore. Index options premium turnover fell about 32%, from ₹85,509 crore to ₹58,572 crore per trading day. Both figures are NSE’s own, from its market statistics.1 2

The difficulty is that the tax was not the only rule affecting the market. Four measures matter, but they did not take effect at once:

  1. STT on option sales rose from 0.10% to 0.15% of premium, on exercised options from 0.125% to 0.15% of intrinsic value, and on futures from 0.02% to 0.05% of traded price, effective 1 April 2026.3
  2. SEBI had already increased the minimum contract size for index derivatives, with exchange changes taking effect in January 2025.4
  3. It had restricted weekly index-derivative products to one benchmark index per exchange from November 2024.4
  4. And it required upfront collection of options premium from buyers, implemented in February 2025.4

Each can change a trader’s costs, access or incentives, in different ways. They were introduced months apart. One observed decline, several potential influences, and no analysis in these public releases that separates their effects.

NSE does not separate them either. Its June Market Pulse identifies both the STT revision and easing volatility as possible contributors, without quantifying how much either explains.1

The substitution story has the same problem. Cash equity average daily turnover rose about 13% between March and May, to ₹1.42 lakh crore, its highest in nearly two years. That looks like money leaving derivatives for shares.1 2

Three things complicate that reading:

  1. The cash rise was already in its third consecutive month by May. Its recovery had begun before the tax changed.1
  2. India VIX, which measures expected volatility, fell after its March spike. Calmer markets change trading conditions regardless of the tax.1
  3. Active cash-market investors fell about 4% from April to May even as daily cash turnover increased. Investors trading above ₹1 crore accounted for about 2.6% of the active base and 92.3% of turnover in May. Fewer people, larger trades.1

Now the more interesting number. Collections rose anyway.

By 10 November 2026, securities transaction tax collections for the financial year had reached ₹54,077.90 crore, against ₹35,681.88 crore at the same point a year earlier: an increase of about 51.6%. Gross direct tax collections rose 14.02% over that period. The levy whose rate went up grew several times faster than the tax take as a whole.5

That does not prove what produced the increase. STT receipts cover more than index futures and options. Rates, the mix of taxable trades and volumes all matter. The published collection table does not separate them. 3 5

The windows do not align, and I think that is relevant.

The turnover figures compare March and May. The collections figure covers a financial year running to 10 November. This establishes that collections rose over a longer period containing those months, not that they rose in exactly those months.

It remains the most interesting number in the set, because higher tax rates, lower activity in some derivatives contracts and rising overall collections coexist. The data cannot tell us what the tax alone did to either activity or revenue.

What survives all of this is narrow.

  • Index futures activity and index options premium turnover fell sharply between March and May 2026.1 2
  • Most individual derivatives traders had been losing money well before the 2026 change, with SEBI’s study of FY22 to FY24 finding 93% in loss and aggregate losses exceeding ₹1.8 lakh crore.6
  • And STT collections rose compared with the same period of the preceding financial year.5

What cannot be established is how much of the decline the tax caused. Settling it would take transaction-level evidence showing which traders reduced or stopped activity and when, alongside an analysis of volatility and the earlier rule changes. These public releases do not provide that separation.

Until someone does, attributing the decline to the tax, in either direction, is filling a gap with a preferred opinion. NSE did not quantify that attribution in its own publication. I am not going to do it in someone else’s.1

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