In depth

Indian Railways Took In ₹2.65 Lakh Crore. Why Was Its Surplus Just ₹2,660 Crore?

With passengers travelling below cost, freight carrying much of the burden and most infrastructure investment funded by the Union Budget, the railway's finances pose a larger question than whether it makes a profit: what should a public railway be expected to pay for itself?

By The Raisina Post Editorial Desk

Lalu Prasad Yadav waving a green flag at a railway ceremony with Ambika Soni standing beside him
ARCHIVE · Lalu Prasad Yadav, then Railway Minister, flags off the Mahaparinirvan special train in New Delhi, 6 October 2007 (PIB caption). Ambika Soni stands alongside. Photograph: Ministry of Railways / PIB, Government of India · GODL-India. The source camera metadata shows an inconsistent 2005 date.

Indian Railways carried nearly 7.3 billion passenger journeys and moved roughly 1.6 billion tonnes of revenue-earning freight in 2024–25. Its gross traffic receipts exceeded ₹2.65 lakh crore. Yet, after its revenue expenditure and miscellaneous transactions, it reported a net revenue surplus of only ₹2,660 crore, about one per cent of those receipts. The figures, drawn from the railway's annual accounts, sound like the result of a system in perpetual financial distress. But they also correct a familiar claim: Indian Railways was not loss-making overall that year. The underlying problem is that its reported surplus is exceptionally small relative to the costs, public obligations and investment needs of the network. ¹ ²

The difference matters. An overall railway account combines activities with very different economics. Passenger operations are priced in part as a public service, while freight is expected to generate income. Salaries, pensions and payments for leased assets consume a large share of annual resources, and new infrastructure is largely financed by the government rather than from operating surpluses. In its audit of the year ended March 2025, tabled in Parliament on 12 August 2026, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) documented both the limits of that model and a troubling backlog of asset replacement. The evidence suggests neither a straightforward commercial failure nor an institution whose finances can be judged entirely by the size of its subsidy. ³ ⁴

The difference between a loss and almost no surplus

Start with the annual operating ratio, a measure of working expenses against traffic earnings. At 98.22 per cent in 2024–25, it meant the railways spent ₹98.22 in the expenses covered by that measure for every ₹100 of traffic revenue. This was a modest improvement on 98.43 per cent in 2023–24. It is not identical to the net revenue margin: after accounting for miscellaneous transactions, the 2024–25 revenue surplus was ₹2,660.28 crore, down from ₹3,259.68 crore the previous year. Gross traffic receipts grew by approximately ₹9,841 crore, but total working expenses also increased by approximately ₹9,875 crore. More business, therefore, did not translate into a larger net surplus. ¹ ³

Indian Railways gross traffic receipts, 2022–23 to 2024–25 · ₹ lakh crore2.32.42.52.62.72022–23: ₹2,39,983 crore2023–24: ₹2,55,273 crore2024–25: ₹2,65,114 croreGross traffic receipts · ₹ lakh crore2022–232023–242024–25
FIGURE 1 · Indian Railways gross traffic receipts, actual annual figures in ₹ crore shown as lakh crore on the axis. Source: Ministry of Railways, Rajya Sabha reply, 6 February 2026. The line connects annual observations; it does not represent quarterly or monthly measurements.

The ten-year record shows how that financial headroom narrowed. The following operating ratios are actual historical results, not budget forecasts, compiled from the Ministry of Railways' parliamentary reply for 2015–16 to 2018–19 and the CAG's 2026 audit for 2019–20 to 2024–25. A figure above 100 means the operating expenses included in the ratio exceeded traffic revenue; a figure below 100 does not mean that the network can finance its own capital programme. ⁵ ³

Financial year Operating ratio
2015–16 90.48%
2016–17 96.50%
2017–18 98.44%
2018–19 97.29%
2019–20 98.36%
2020–21 97.45%
2021–22 107.39%
2022–23 98.10%
2023–24 98.43%
2024–25 98.22%
Indian Railways operating ratio over ten years90%95%100%105%110%15–16: 90%16–17: 97%17–18: 98%18–19: 97%19–20: 98%20–21: 97%21–22: 107%22–23: 98%23–24: 98%24–25: 98%Operating ratio15–1616–1717–1818–1919–2020–2121–2222–2323–2424–25
FIGURE 2 · Annual operating ratio, 2015–16 to 2024–25. A value above 100% indicates covered operating costs exceeding traffic revenue. Sources: Ministry of Railways, 2020 parliamentary reply, and CAG Railway Finances, Report No. 30 of 2026. Interpolated curves guide the eye between the actual annual data points.

The decade contains genuine variation, including a ratio above 100 in 2021–22, rather than ten consecutive years of identical losses. Yet the broader change is visible: since 2016–17, the ratio has spent most years close to or above 97 per cent. PRS Legislative Research links one major deterioration to implementation of the Seventh Central Pay Commission. Between 2015–16 and 2016–17, salary and pension spending rose by 26 per cent, while the operating ratio climbed sharply. Later fluctuations also reflect pandemic-era disruption, the timing of spending and accounting choices. The series identifies financial pressure; by itself, it cannot establish how much of that pressure represents inefficiency rather than policy or obligations. ⁴

The passenger railway and the freight railway are not equally profitable

The clearest explanation is in the same CAG report. In 2024–25, passenger and other coaching services recorded an operating loss of ₹63,721.56 crore, while freight services recorded an operating profit of ₹50,505.68 crore. Every zonal railway made a loss on passenger services, according to the audit, although six zones also failed to make a freight profit. The passenger and freight figures come from the CAG's allocation of operating earnings and expenses, including the apportionment of certain sundry earnings between the two businesses. They should not be confused with the narrower passenger-ticket and freight-receipt totals that appear elsewhere in railway statistics. ³

In this model, freight customers effectively support affordable passenger travel. That is not an accidental bookkeeping result. Indian Railways runs suburban trains, ordinary and long-distance services, routes with weak demand and services that connect areas where fare recovery alone may not justify operations. The political and economic value of such access is wider than a ticket sale. Cheap or comparatively affordable rail travel can make commuting possible, improve access to work and education, and connect smaller towns to major markets. None of these benefits automatically appears as a profit in a railway account. On the other hand, the size of the public-service obligation needs to be measured and funded transparently, not treated as a reason to ignore operating efficiency. ⁴

Freight is not an unlimited source of compensation. The National Rail Plan, as summarised by PRS, recognises that cross-subsidisation contributes to Indian rail freight charges being high compared with international peers. Higher logistics costs can affect industries, power producers, commodity movements and ultimately consumers. They can also weaken rail's commercial appeal relative to road transport, particularly for shipments where price, transit time and delivery reliability matter as much as carrying capacity. This does not establish that every freight rate is excessive or that all road freight is cheaper. It does mean that the price of a passenger subsidy may partly be borne outside the passenger system, through the transport bills of firms and their customers. ⁴

The audit shows the strain in numbers. Passenger and other coaching losses had fallen from about ₹72,169 crore in 2020–21 to ₹60,041 crore in 2022–23, but increased to around ₹64,570 crore in 2023–24 before easing to ₹63,722 crore in 2024–25. Freight's operating profit rose from about ₹17,252 crore to ₹55,889 crore over the first four of those years, then slipped to about ₹50,506 crore. Thus freight earnings helped fund passenger services but did not, on the CAG's segment accounting, fully offset passenger and coaching losses in 2024–25. It would be wrong to subtract these two figures and describe the remainder as the railway's overall loss: the consolidated accounts include other income, charges and adjustments. ³

Indian Railways annual net revenue surplus · ₹ crore09001800270036002022–23: 25172023–24: 32602024–25: 2660Net revenue surplus2022–232023–242024–25
FIGURE 3 · Indian Railways' net revenue surplus, actual annual figures in ₹ crore. Source: Ministry of Railways, Rajya Sabha reply of 6 February 2026. Curves connect the annual observations; they do not imply quarterly or monthly measurements.

A large workforce, and bills that persist after retirement

The railways' operating costs cannot be explained by energy or maintenance alone. The 2026–27 Union Budget analysis by PRS estimates that salaries will use about 41 per cent of internal revenue and pensions a further 25 per cent. Together they account for roughly two-thirds of expected revenue before the railway pays for many other recurring needs. PRS calculates that salaries and pensions absorbed an average 71 per cent of internal revenue across the preceding decade. Employee compensation is also the cost of operating and maintaining a labour-intensive, safety-critical network; the existence of a large wage bill is not itself proof of unnecessary employment. The real question is whether the railway is obtaining sufficient productivity and service quality for that expenditure. ⁴

Borrowing and leasing add another layer. Rolling stock and other railway assets have been financed partly through Indian Railway Finance Corporation (IRFC), which borrows and leases assets to the railway system. PRS estimates outstanding liabilities associated with the leasing arrangement at about ₹4.3 lakh crore in 2026–27, compared with ₹1.6 lakh crore in 2017–18. It estimates interest payments of ₹35,130 crore and principal payments of ₹39,650 crore in 2026–27. These are budget estimates, not audited final payments for that year. It would be misleading to add all principal repayments to ordinary operating costs or call them a current-year commercial loss; the point is that they compete with other uses of cash and make financing new infrastructure more demanding. ⁴

The distinction between recurring expense and capital financing is essential. Wages, pensions, fuel and day-to-day maintenance need to be funded continuously. A new line, an electrification programme or a replacement fleet can serve the public for decades and will not normally recover its full cost from the first year's fares. But the capital still has to come from somewhere. If operating surpluses are small, the government must supply it from taxation and borrowing, or the railway must use other financing arrangements. That does not make every new project uneconomic: it means an operating surplus and the ability to finance expansion are different measures of railway health. ¹ ⁴

What the surplus does not tell us about worn-out assets

The latest CAG assessment makes the question sharper. Indian Railways appropriated ₹800 crore to its Depreciation Reserve Fund in 2024–25 against a budget estimate of ₹1,000 crore and spent ₹540.67 crore from that fund. The audit estimated that renewal and replacement of over-aged assets worth ₹6,448 crore had been carried forward into 2025–26. This backlog included signalling, telecommunications and other works. CAG described the annual provision as insignificant compared with replacement requirements and warned that deferred renewal matters for the safe running of trains. The ₹6,448 crore figure is a measured backlog of identified works, not a valuation of all ageing railway assets or an estimate of the cost of making the entire network safe. ³

This is where a positive operating ratio can give an incomplete impression. Depreciation provisions are intended to recognise the need to replace assets that wear out. If allocations are too low, the revenue account may appear more comfortable while work moves into future years or depends on other budget heads. CAG noted that transferring even the entire ₹2,660 crore surplus to depreciation needs would still be short of the identified requirement; it calculated that such an appropriation would push the operating ratio to 99.22 per cent. That is an auditor's sensitivity calculation, not proof that the published 98.22 per cent figure was arithmetically false. It demonstrates how thin the margin becomes when renewal obligations are brought closer to the centre of the accounting discussion. ³

The problem is not that no renewal spending happens. Railway capital plans include track renewal, signalling, safety works and bridge upgrades under multiple funding channels, not just the Depreciation Reserve Fund. In the 2026–27 annual plan, a parliamentary standing committee recorded proposed allocations of ₹22,853 crore for track renewals and ₹7,500 crore for signalling and telecommunications from budgetary sources, among other works. These allocations cannot be directly compared with the DRF expenditure as though they were the same account. They do, however, show why an assessment of maintenance and safety must consider the whole funding system rather than a single reserve. ⁶

The Union Budget has become the principal financier

For 2026–27, Indian Railways has budgeted capital expenditure of ₹2,93,030 crore. According to the parliamentary standing committee, ₹2,78,030 crore is to come from gross budgetary support from the central government, ₹12,000 crore from extra-budgetary resources and only ₹3,000 crore from internally generated resources. That amounts to about 95 per cent of capital expenditure being funded through the Union Budget. The projected capital programme is not an actual expenditure figure for a completed year, and capital funding is not directly comparable with the ₹2,660 crore revenue surplus recorded in 2024–25. Nevertheless, the contrast shows that the railway's expansion and renewal depend primarily on public financing. ⁶ ⁴

That dependence may be defensible. A railway offers benefits beyond its own income statement: moving people at scale, linking regions, relieving roads, supporting employment and providing a potentially lower-emission way to move some forms of traffic. But public capital is scarce and its use must still be justified. A new line selected for social connectivity should be assessed with those benefits made explicit; a freight corridor promoted as an efficiency investment should be measured against capacity, speed, demand and cost. Neither deserves automatic approval merely because it is public infrastructure. The 2026–27 parliamentary committee urged timely execution and attention to project delays, a reminder that the quality of investment matters alongside its amount. ⁶

There are also reasons to question how effectively existing assets are used. PRS reported that the average speed of ordinary freight trains was about 25 km/h in 2023–24, only modestly above 23.3 km/h in 2017–18. Dedicated freight corridors have improved conditions on some routes, but PRS noted that their average speeds remained below their design aspirations and that utilisation differed considerably between corridors. Freight concentration in coal and bulk commodities further exposes the revenue base to changes in the composition of the economy and industrial demand. These findings support scrutiny of network efficiency, rather than the assumption that the answer must always be higher freight charges or lower passenger subsidies. ⁴

A public service cannot avoid an accounting question

There are several policy choices, none costless. Passenger fares can be adjusted more regularly, with targeted concessions for those who need them. That would improve fare recovery but could impose a disproportionate burden on low-income and frequent travellers unless protection were carefully designed. Alternatively, the Union Budget could compensate the railway transparently for defined social-service obligations, rather than expecting freight users to absorb much of the cost. That would make the subsidy more visible to taxpayers, but would not eliminate it. Operational reforms, stronger freight reliability, better asset utilisation and more disciplined project selection could reduce the amount of support required; none can instantly remove pensions, debt commitments or the obligation to keep services safe. ⁴ ³

A useful reform programme would therefore publish several measures together: the consolidated revenue surplus; the passenger-service cost-recovery gap; freight profits and prices; the operating ratio under a clear accounting definition; the condition and renewal backlog of critical assets; and capital spending split by internal generation, government support and borrowing. Those measures answer different questions. A lower operating ratio would not, on its own, show affordable transport had been preserved or that deferred replacements had been completed. Equally, a large publicly funded capital programme would not, on its own, prove that trains had become faster, safer or more commercially attractive. A system this consequential should not be judged by a single ratio. ³ ⁴

The available accounts point to a more precise conclusion than the claim that Indian Railways is always in loss. In 2024–25, the railway as a whole reported a surplus, its passenger and coaching business lost money, its freight business made money, and its own funds covered little of the investment needed for the future. The issue is not simply whether the railway should behave like a company or a welfare department. It is whether India has made the costs of affordable travel, reliable freight and renewal of the railway network sufficiently explicit—and whether public money is producing the services and assets that those costs are meant to buy. ¹ ³


Data and methodology: Financial figures for 2024–25 are audited or reported historical results. Figures attributed to the 2026–27 Budget are estimates, not final outcomes. The ten-year operating-ratio table joins the ministry's retrospective parliamentary reply (2015–16 through 2018–19) and CAG Report No. 30 of 2026 (2019–20 through 2024–25); reporting conventions and cost allocations limit direct comparisons with private-company profit margins. Passenger/coaching and freight profit/loss estimates are from CAG's allocated segment accounts, not ticket-only or freight-billing receipts. No on-the-ground reporting, interviews or response requests are claimed. Photo source and GODL-India reuse terms verified; source caption and camera EXIF disagree on the year (official event caption gives 2007). Chart figures use annual observations connected with shape-preserving interpolation. Original source records, historical photograph attribution and chart methodology accompany the published article.